Modern computer systems include numerous compute elements, from CPUs to GPUs to accelerators. Harnessing their full potential requires well-defined, properly-implemented memory consistency models (MCMs), and low-level system functionality such as virtual memory and address translation (AT). Unfortunately, it is difficult to specify and implement hardware-OS interactions correctly; in the past, many hardware and OS specification mismatches have resulted in implementation bugs in commercial processors.
Introduction
Computer systems are becoming increasingly complex, with multiple processing elements (e.g., multicore CPUs, GPUs, and other accelerators) running multiple layers of system software (user code, libraries, operating systems, hypervisors, etc.). These heterogeneous systems frequently enable inter-element communication by presenting the user with an abstraction of shared virtual memory, even when the underlying hardware may contain discrete physical memory blocks [11, 42] . Harnessing these systems' full potential requires careful coordination between the hardware and the OS to ensure that the memory consistency model(s) (MCMs) and address translation (AT) mechanisms are properlyimplemented. Unfortunately, the ability to rigorously verify these subsystems and their interactions with each other remains a vexing problem.
Recent years have seen increased attention being paid to the need for well-defined memory models and analysis techniques at each layer of the hardware-software stack. Many architectures and programming languages have recently developed formal consistency model specifications [10, 13, 30] and tools to help analyze them [3, 40] . However, most (but not all [38, 39] ) of these models ignore the implications of virtual-to-physical address translation, such as synonyms and page permission updates, on memory ordering. Furthermore, these tools cannot verify the underlying implementations of these models, leaving a verification gap within which bugs often arise.
A key challenge is that microarchitectural events (i.e., those which are not architecturally visible) and OS behavior can affect memory ordering in ways for which standard (i.e., non-translation-aware) memory consistency analysis can be fundamentally insufficient [38, 39] . Proper implementation of a memory model requires correctness to be maintained through library calls, through system calls, and through the varying and/or unpredictable behavior of the microarchitecture. Events within each of these layers interact with and affect the state of memory, and, crucially, events within these low-level layers may behave differently from the "normal" accesses described by the formal memory model. For example, on the x86-64 architecture, which implements the rela-tively strong total store ordering (TSO) memory model [32] , events such as page table accesses may be inherently racy: page table walks are automatically issued by hardware, can happen at any time, and are often not ordered with respect to most fences [16, 20] .
No existing notion of memory consistency captures the strictest possible translation-aware set of orderings. As we show in this paper, even data-race-free programs [1] , sequentially consistent machines [23] , and systems obeying sequential consistency for virtual address memory consistency (SC-for-VAMC) [38, 39] can nevertheless be prone to (perhaps surprising) ordering bugs. These bugs relate to the checking of metadata which is not directly associated with the virtual or the physical address being accessed; this places it outside the scope of memory consistency, including VAMC. We therefore use the term memory transistency model to refer to any set of memory ordering rules which explicitly takes virtual-to-physical address translation issues into account, even through the extra layers of indirection needed above.
To aid in the analysis of transistency models and their implementations, this work develops techniques and toolscollectively called COATCheck-for verifying memory ordering enforcement in the context of virtual-to-physical address translation. COATCheck extends existing tools and techniques [26, 29] to allow users to reason about system calls, interrupts, microcode, and so on. The goal of COATCheck is to improve the ability to specify and verify system behaviors at an already bug-prone interface [38, 39] whose complexity is worsening with heterogeneous parallelism. Our contributions are as follows.
First, we demonstrate a comprehensive yet tractable methodology for specifying and statically verifying memory ordering enforcement at the hardware-OS interface. We develop a Domain-Specific Language (DSL) called µspec within which each component in a system (e.g., each pipeline stage, each cache, each TLB) can independently specify its own contribution to memory ordering using the languages of first-order logic and µhb graphs [26, 27, 29] . µspec extends the constraint-based approach of previous work [29] to support modeling of TLB occupancy, page table walk microcode, activities that emit memory references despite not being part of the user-level instruction stream, system calls for memory allocation (e.g., malloc/mmap), and interrupts (e.g., inter-processor interrupts to maintain TLB coherence). The µspec approach allows components to be swapped in and out without affecting others, thereby providing a more modular approach to memory ordering verification.
Second, we develop a fast and general-purpose constraint solver which automates the analysis of µspec specifications, thereby allowing interactive exploration of memory ordering scenarios more complex than previous tools have handled. We demonstrate the use of COATCheck (the methodol- Finally, we use COATCheck to identify cases in which transistency goes beyond the traditional scope of consistency. We demonstrate cases where even sequentially consistent (or, following recent work, SC for VAMC [38, 39] ) code may be buggy due to improper handling of page table entry status bits for virtual address synonyms. Overall, our work offers formal, yet practical tools for memory ordering checking, and it broadens the very scope of memory consistency.
Overview

Background and Motivation
As motivation, consider the litmus test 3 in Figure 1a . As written, x and y appear to be distinct addresses. Under that assumption, Figure 1b shows that even a strong MCM such as sequential consistency (SC) [23] considers the proposed final values to be observable, because an event interleaving exists to achieve that value outcome. If instead, as in Figure 1c, x and y are actually synonyms (i.e., both map to the same physical address), the test is forbidden by SC, because if the addresses are the same, no interleaving of the threads produces the proposed outcome. While simple, this example highlights how memory ordering verification is fundamentally incomplete unless it explicitly accounts for address translation when determining expected behaviors and verifying correctness.
Relationship to Past Work: The bulk of prior MCM work has focused on the high-level programming language and hardware layers [2, 10, 13, 30, 32, 40] . However, abstractions effective at these levels (e.g., SC-for-DRF [1] , TSO [43] ) are often ineffective at the hardware level, as high-performance data structures and low-level hardware operations are often inherently weakly ordered and racy. For example, although x86 processors implement the Total Store Ordering (TSO) MCM, page table walks are TSOordered with respect to neither normal memory accesses nor mfence instructions (which enforce orderings between all normal loads and stores) [16, 20] . Likewise, many parallel data structures bypass software memory models in favor of higher-performance (but less portable) assembly implementations that interface more directly with the non-SC hardware memory model [10, 24, 25, 31] .
Romanescu et al. were the first to distinguish between MCMs meant for virtual addresses (VAMC) and those for physical addresses (PAMC) [38, 39] . They considered hardware to be responsible for enforcing the latter, and a combination of hardware and OS for the former. Accordingly, traditional hardware models such as TSO would fall under PAMC, while synonyms, page mapping changes, and side effects (i.e., page status bits) would be added to form VAMC. COATCheck provides a rigorous means of specifying and verifying the interaction between the two models. This paper also goes beyond the VAMC-PAMC distinction to identify cases in which ordering bugs can be found even when both VAMC and PAMC are made sequentially consistent.
PipeCheck and CCICheck verify memory ordering enforcement through the use of microarchitecture-level happensbefore (µhb) graphs [26, 27, 29] . PipeCheck performs MCM verification by enumerating a complete family of µhb graphs for any given litmus test. CCICheck extends PipeCheck to handle coherence-consistency interface issues. COATCheck extends both of these by providing a fully-general DSL for specifying ordering enforcement, and by demonstrating how PAMC, VAMC, and transistency in general can be analyzed using µhb graphs. Figure 2 shows layers at which memory ordering issues might be considered. Our work enables the building and verification of detailed models for hardware-OS memory ordering implications, particularly focusing on layers 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 2 . This allows us to analyze memory ordering in an execution stream that includes library and kernel code, as well as microcode-level events such as the hardware page table walks executed on behalf of the program at TLB misses. Previously, incomplete specifications, incorrect implementations, or poor coordination between the layers could (and did [5, 6, 18, 21] ) cause bugs. These include forbidden multithreaded outcomes becoming observable, legal data disappearing due to incorrect updates of page table entry dirty bits, processors experiencing deadlock/livelock, and any number of other undesirable outcomes.
The COATCheck Approach
COATCheck overcomes these problems by building modular models of memory ordering enforcement at the hardware-OS interface. In particular, each component (a pipeline stage, a page table walker, an OS mechanism, etc.) can specify its own independent contribution to memory ordering enforcement. Prior to verification, the independent contributions of the components which form the system under test are merged into a single overall specification. The COATCheck tool then uses this combined specification to generate families of µhb graphs to statically verify the overall correctness of the system. Figure 3 shows the overall COATCheck toolflow. First, traditional (i.e., address translation-unaware) litmus tests are converted into enhanced litmus tests which include all (micro) code relevant to memory ordering. Second, the enhanced litmus test is analyzed according to the rules of the µspec specification of the orderings enforced at various parts of the system. This produces a set of constraints describing the conditions under which the outcome proposed by the litmus test would be observable. Third, the constraints are analyzed by the COATCheck constraint solver tool to determine whether any observable execution (in the form of a µhb graph) can be found. We analyze each step in detail in the sections that follow.
After describing the overall flow, Section 6 gives the concrete example of how a system consisting of Intel Sandy Bridge-like hardware, a Linux-like OS, and interesting litmus tests as software can be modeled and analyzed using COATCheck. This is followed with an analysis of the perfor- mance of the COATCheck constraint solver, using the above system as a case study.
Beyond Traditional Litmus Tests
Litmus tests have become a standard tool in memory model analysis. This section describes how we derive Enhanced Litmus Tests (ELTs) which account for address translation operations, page table walks, remappings, memoryaccessing microcode, and other operations relevant to memory ordering and other system-level operations that execute concurrently with, and on behalf of, user-level code.
Enhanced Litmus Tests: An Overview
ELTs use three key constructs in moving beyond traditional, user-level litmus tests. First, ELTs describe virtual and physical addresses as distinct and simultaneous entities. In the same way that traditional litmus tests propose an outcome consisting of a set of values returned by the loads in the program, ELTs likewise propose as part of the outcome the physical addresses used by each access. In this way, the analysis of later sections can directly test whether a proposed set of address translation outcomes is legal. Second, ELTs incorporate relevant chunks of OS activity, such as map/remap functions (MRFs) or inter-processor interrupts (IPIs) as used in software TLB coherence [37, 46] . They similarly include events such as the sending of IPIs, register reads/writes which cause the enabling/disabling of interrupts, and so on.
Third, ELTs include "ghost instructions" which model lower-than-ISA operations (e.g., page table walks) executed by the hardware on behalf of user-level or system-level code, even if these instructions are not fetched, decoded or issued as part of the normal ISA-level instruction stream. The combined power of address tracking, ghost instructions and OS module insertions gives ELTs sufficient expressive power to test all aspects of memory ordering enforcement as it relates to address translation. Figure 4 presents an example flow from user-level litmus test to ELT. Our example shows the store buffering (sb) litmus test, which will be further discussed in Section 7. The stated test outcome is forbidden under sequential consistency (because it does not represent any simple interleaving of the four user-level instructions), but as its name implies, it is observable under models such as TSO which allow store buffering/store→load reordering to be visible. We form a more system-oriented example by inserting an extra system call to mprotect at the beginning of thread 0 in Figure 4a .
Litmus Test Expansion Synopses
As Figure 4 shows, each ELT comes about as the result of a sequence of modification passes. We systematize this transformation in the form of litmus test expansion synopses, or simply synopses for short. Each synopsis is a "recipe" for expanding each instruction in an input litmus test into one or more instructions in an output litmus test. As described below, there is some flexibility in what the recipes look like: the original instruction may or may not be maintained, and instruction expansions may insert new code into other threads as well. Furthermore, each expanded instruction may be inserted either before or after the original instruction. In this way, synopses serve as succinct representations of behaviors that we hope might one day become more rigorously and precisely formalized.
From User-Level to Kernel-Aware Litmus tests
Incorporating system calls and kernel-level code into a userlevel litmus test requires multiple changes. First, in the invoking thread (e.g., Thread 0 in Figure 4a ), we must be able to substitute the system call with a module of memory reference operations that correctly encapsulate the system call behavior relevant to memory ordering verification. Figure 4b continues the example of Figure 4a by expanding the system call into a set of four instructions on the invoking Thread 0. The expanded regions are shaded in blue.
It is worth noting that this expansion can affect multiple threads at once. Because one of the instructions expanded in Thread 0 triggers an inter-processor interrupt (IPI), we also add a three instruction interrupt handler to all of the other threads (in this case, Thread 1a). Notably, since the relative timing of Thread 0 and Thread 1a has not yet been established, it is also impossible (at this point) to determine the relative ordering of Threads 1a and 1b. For example, while it is clear that the interrupt handler must happen sometime after the interrupt is originally triggered, there is little other synchronization between the threads. Any such orderings will be filled in later by the µspec specification of IPI behavior in the microarchitecture in question.
Outcome: Permitted (b) User+Kernel litmus test. On core 1, threads 1a and 1b will be interleaved in some fashion, but the interleaving cannot be statically determined. The "R/W" store value is shorthand to indicate that the entire PTE is written, but with the R/W bit set. OS Synopses: On the invoking core, an OS synopsis specifies a mapping from each system call into a simple predefined sequence of microops capturing the effects of that system call on address translation and consistency. When the system call contains an inter-processor interrupt (IPI), the OS synopsis also instantiates pre-defined interrupt handler threads on those cores, again using a sequence of staticallydetermined instructions. Each interrupt handler may be arbitrarily interleaved with the other thread(s) assigned to that core, subject to µspec constraints (Section 4.2).
We do not curently model the complexities of OS decision making or data structures; our OS synopses currently include only memory accesses which update the paging structures and any synchronization used to enforced orderings with respect to these updates. However, these synopses could be made more sophisticated as needed; we believe that attempting to formalize the relationship between these OS synopses and the full OS code would make for interesting follow-up work.
Memory-Accessing Microcode: Ghost Instructions
During V-P translation, there are many microcode operations which are not fetched as ISA-level instructions (either user or kernel) but which still play a key role in enforcing consistency. These microcode operations are used to support hardware page table walks, TLB refills, accessed/dirty bit updates, and so on. We refer to these operations as ghost instructions, as they are present but not visible to the user or to the OS kernel.
The presence and behavior of ghost instructions depends heavily both on the architecture and on the microarchitecture in question. At an architecture level, operations such as page table walks may be specified as being enforced entirely by hardware, entirely by software, or anywhere in between. COATCheck is flexible enough to cover any point on this spectrum. We break this problem into two parts: the specification of the instructions (and ghost instructions) which are emitted to cause ordering to be enforced (this section), and the specification of the orderings enforced between these instructions at different points in their executions (Section 4.2).
Figure 4c depicts an ELT derived from Figure 4b . Darker red-shaded regions are microcode operations that have been expanded at this phase; lighter blue regions remain those expanded in the previous step. For this test scenario, thread 0's access to [x] requires a page table walk, because the TLB entry for that virtual address would have been invalidated by the invlpg instruction. Also, since the initial condition states that the page containing [x] is clean, hardware would also mark the page as dirty prior to the write (specified to occur on x86 using a LOCKed atomic operation [20] ). Other accesses may also take TLB misses and trigger page table walks themselves, although (for space reasons) the figure does not show all of them. Finally, the ELT includes hardware operations for receiving the interrupt, saving state, and disabling nested interrupts via the microcode preamble to thread 1b. In this example, hardware is responsible for saving state, but software is responsible for restoring it. This again highlights the degree of collective responsibility between hardware and OS for ensuring ordering correctness.
Microarchitecture Synopses: As with the OS synopses, our microarchitecture synopses currently consist of rela- tively straightforward pre-defined expansions which insert page table walk ghost instructions next to each normal instruction. Unlikely as it may be, for completeness we perform this expansion for every instruction, as each instruction may cause a TLB miss and hence trigger a page table walk, and every instruction may update the associated page status bits. Likewise, the expansions of loads in our current synopses include ghost instructions corresponding to accessing both clean and dirty pages, as both possibilities must be considered. The comprehensive enumeration performed by the µspec models may choose to use all ghost instructions, or it may choose to ignore optional possibilities which are not needed (e.g., PT walks not needed during TLB hits) or impossible (e.g., a page being clean and dirty simultaneously).
As with the OS synopses, we envision microarchitecture synopses becoming more sophisticated as needed. Further, we envision that the notion of such synopses will ultimately become part of future microarchitectural specifications too.
µspec:
A µhb Graph-Centric Ordering Specification Language
Background: µhb Graphs
Microarchitecture-level happens-before (µhb) graphs capture consistency model enforcement at the implementation level [26, 27] . Figure 5 gives an example. Nodes in a µhb graph represent events corresponding to a particular instruction (column) at a particular physical location (row). For example, a node may represent a particular instruction passing through a particular pipeline stage. Edges represent happensbefore orderings guaranteed by some property of the microarchitecture: an instruction flowing through a pipeline, a FIFO-ordered structure, the passage of a message, and so on. All edges in a µhb graph are equivalent, regardless of their label. This allows the transitive closure of two µhb graphs to itself always be a legal µhb graph, and it implies that any cycle in a µhb graph indicates that the execution is infeasible. This places µhb graphs in contrast to some other existing approaches in which only specific subsets of a happens-before graph are analyzed for cycles [3] .
Axiom "ReadsFrom": forall microops "r", IsRead r => exists microop "w", IsWrite w /\ SamePhysicalAddress w r /\ SameData w r /\ EdgeExists ((w, AccessMemory), (r, AccessMemory), "rf"). 
µspec: A DSL for Specifying µhb Graph Orderings
µspec is a domain specific language in which hardware or software component designers express the ordering relationships enforced by that component. Through the µspec specification, designers provide a set of µhb graph-focused axioms which must all be satisfied for a given test to be considered observable [29] . This axiomatic approach is widely used in memory model analysis [2, 3, 28, 32] , but µspec extends this down to a lower level of abstraction. µspec axioms are first order logic (i.e., AND, OR, NOT, EXISTS, FORALL) statements built on top of instructionand µhb graph-related predicates. The instruction-related predicates are used to constrain an axiom to a relevant subset of instructions. For example, an axiom that states a property relating two reads to the same physical address would use the two predicates IsRead and SamePhysicalAddress.
The core µspec axiom is the predicate EdgeExists (or, in plural form, EdgesExist). This predicate takes three arguments: a source µhb node, a destination µhb node, and a label. The nodes are in turn formed of two components: an instruction, and a microarchitectural location or event. These correspond to the column and row of the node in the µhb graph, respectively. The edge label is purely cosmetic, as all edges in a µhb graph are equivalent (Section 4.1). Figure 6 gives an example of the µspec syntax. The ReadsFrom axiom asserts that for every read r, there must be some corresponding write w to the same physical address. Further, this write must match the value returned by the read. When such a read is found, the axiom specifies that an edge labeled "rf" should be added to the µhb graph between the two µhb nodes (w, AccessMemory) and (r, AccessMemory). If there is more than one candidate for w which satisfies SamePhysicalAddress and SameData, then each possibility (and sub-cases derived thereof) will be considered independently by the constraint solver (Section 5).
Each axiom in a µspec model specification represents an independent and ideally localized property of one particular mechanism. Component models are formed by conjoining (i.e., logically ANDing) the axioms within a model. Likewise, system models are built by conjoining the models of the components forming the system. The overall system specification therefore consists of a first order logic formula whose satisfiability determines whether a proposed execution is feasible on the system being analyzed.
The approach of separating out individual axioms makes µspec models highly modular: axioms can be added or removed as necessary without affecting any of the other ax-ioms or components. In other words, this approach allows microarchitecture-specific axioms to be easily swapped out for another set while OS-and architecture-level are kept unchanged, to give just one example. While µspec cannot (yet) automate the extraction of a specification from Verilog or HDLs, it does greatly reduce the effort required to express ordering requirements and expectations, and we hope to elaborate on this aspect in future work.
Constraint Solver and Software Implementation
As described in Section 4.2, the µspec specification of a system produces a first-order logic formula whose satisfiability corresponds to the feasibility of a particular execution. The COATCheck constraint solver accepts this formula and some litmus test as inputs, and it searches to find any execution of that test which satisfies all of the constraints of the model. If one can be found, then the proposed outcome is observable. If not, then the proposed outcome is forbidden. In PipeCheck, which introduced µhb graphs, the graphs were generated using naive exhaustive enumeration [26, 27] . However, the PipeCheck approach does not scale to the sizes and numbers of graphs needed to handle ELTs.
Constraint Solver Algorithm
The preliminary step in the solving process is to eliminate the quantifiers in the formula. Doing so produces a quantifier-free propositional logic formula that is more directly amenable to being solved. Since the domain of each quantifier is concrete in the context of some particular litmus test, the quantifiers are removed by simply converting each forall into a conjuction (AND) over its domain (i.e., cores, threads, or instructions). Likewise, each exists is converted into a disjunction (OR). The solver algorithm itself resembles and is inspired by the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) algorithm widely used in SAT solvers [14] . We apply it to µhb graphs, making our solver resemble a primitive but effective SMT solver for the theory of acyclic directed graphs. At a high level, the solver uses a backtracking approach: given a starting point, it generates a list of subcases of "either-or" edge additions, and it then recursively descends into each subcase, abandoning those which cannot satisfy the given conditions and stopping when it reaches a leaf node (i.e., an acyclic graph). Although we could have used an off-the-shelf SAT or SMT solver, our custom solver provided significantly better debugging ability and status visualization (e.g., of partiallycompleted µhb graphs and decision trees) than would have been possible with a black-box solver. We found this empirically to be very useful during our work.
Software Toolchain
We implemented the COATCheck methodology into the complete working toolflow shown in Figure 3 . In normal operation, the tool takes as input a user-level litmus test, HW/OS synopses (Section 3.1), and µspec models (Section 4.2). For low-level debugging, the tool also allows the direct input of a manually-written ELT (bypassing the synopses). The ELT and component µspec models feed into the model analyzer, which applies the axioms of the models to the ELT to generate a tree of µhb graph constraints. The constraints are then passed to the constraint solver to determine if the outcome is feasible.
Our core analysis infrastructure is written in Coq to allow for formal verification [44] .
Because we aim for backwards compatibility with existing MCM analysis frameworks, we interface our tool with herd and the litmus format [3] . This allows us to draw from a large existing body of litmus tests. Although these tests do not distinguish virtual and physical addresses, they serve as valuable sanity checks for the basic correctness of a pipeline model. Furthermore, hardware models from previous work [26, 27, 38, 39] can be easily adapted into µspec and our OS models, and hence into COATCheck as well.
Detailed Processor+OS Model Case Study
This section presents an in-depth case study of how hardware and software designers might use COATCheck and µspec to model a high-performance out-of-order processor and OS, respectively. The resulting µspec model is the one used for Section 7's litmus test case studies, and Section 8 performance results.
Basic Overview
Our case study model has three main parts, two of which are provided by the hardware designer and one of which is provided by someone familiar with the OS. The first component is a µspec model which describes a given processor microarchitecture. This model provides a set of µspec axioms representing the ordering constraints enforced by the hardware. In this case study, this hardware component is inspired by the Intel Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, and was developed in detail using public documentation [19, 20] , information gleaned from patents [16] , and some educated guesses used to fill in gaps. Many of the low-level details remain proprietary, so it cannot be an exact match, but the paper nevertheless refers to this as our SandyBridge model. Table 1 gives an overall enumeration of the µspec axioms in this model.
The second component is a SandyBridge hardware synopsis (Section 3.4) which specifies how litmus tests might be expanded by hardware when executed on SandyBridge. These expansions pertain to hardware page serted within the litmus test. The third component is the Linux OS synopsis (Section 3.3) that specifies code sequences for system calls and for interrupt handlers. Our Linux synopsis is derived from careful inspection of the Linux source code (and, for the architecture-specific portions, the 64-bit x86 version). Note that there is no µspec model for the Linux component; this is because the software specifies the instructions to be executed (i.e., the column headings in a µhb graph), while the hardware actually executes the instructions (i.e., the nodes and edges in the graph). In general, the µspec model and hardware synopsis rely on hardware knowledge, and the OS synopsis relies on OS knowledge, but the three components compose together; no single designer must be fluent across all components. In the text that follows, we discuss several important-to-model aspects of hardware-OS behavior. For each, we describe how the µspec model, the hardware synopsis and the OS synopsis work together to reflect the appropriate hardware-OS behavior.
Memory Dependency Prediction and Disambiguation
The first type of functionality we consider is a sophisticated, high-performance store buffer (SB) forwarding mechanism. We focus on capturing the key role address translation plays in the store buffer. If the implementation operated using only virtual addresses, for example, then it would be unable to detect virtual address synonyms, leading to problems such as the one in Figure 7 . Placing the TLB on the critical path would avoid this problem; however, this would x and y are synonyms
Proposed outcome: r1=1 Figure 7 : Store buffer forwarding implementations must be able to detect synonyms to ensure that each load receives its value from the latest store to the same physical address come with a performance cost. This realistic example reveals the perhaps-surprising complexity involved in the seemingly straightforward process of store buffer forwarding. We start by describing the mechanism, and we then describe its implementation in µspec. Hardware or OS synopses are not used in modeling this feature, so they are not discussed.
Mechanism: High-performance forwarding in our SandyBridge model consists of memory dependency prediction and memory disambiguation [19] . The prediction stage anticipates dynamic same-physical address dependencies between stores and loads to try to preemptively prevent consistency violations that might arise. The disambiguation stage later ensures that all predictions were correct. This pairing ensures that synonyms can be detected while keeping the TLB off of the forwarding critical path.
The mechanism we model works as follows. All stores write their virtual address and data into the SB in parallel with accessing the TLB. The physical address is later written into the SB as well, once the TLB provides it. Loads, in parallel with accessing the TLB, write their lower 12 bits ("index bits") into a CAM-based load buffer that holds all loads that have not yet committed. Due to the minimum 4KB page size, these lower 12 bits will always be identical between virtual and physical addresses.
Initially, each load compares its index bits against the index bits of all older stores present in the store buffer. If no index match is found among the filled-in entries, then clearly no match exists. If an older entry is allocated but not filled in (because its address was not yet generated), it is predicted to cause no dependencies. If an index match is found, the load will then compare high-order bits. If the load's virtual tag matches the virtual tag of the store, the store will forward its value to the load 4 . If not, the load compares its physical tag against the store's physical tag, stalling if either instruction's TLB access has not yet returned a translation. If the physical tags match, the store will forward its data to the load. Otherwise, the load will have determined that no dependency exists between the load and that particular store.
In addition to the above, our model must also reflect disambiguation, in which stores determine whether their speculations were legal. Before each store commits, it checks the load buffer to see if any younger loads matching the same µspec Axioms: Based on that store buffer mechanism, Figure 8 shows a µspec model snippet of one piece of the prediction and disambiguation mechanism; other pieces are analogous but omitted for space reasons. The figure shows a µspec snippet for the sub-case in which a load has an index match, virtual tag miss, and physical tag match with a previous store.
The first part of the code, 'exists microop "w"', will only evaluate to true if there is at least one microop that satisfies the enclosed statements. The middle part enforces orderings via two types of µhb edges: some ensuring that the write w is still in the store buffer when the load i searches for it, and some describing the path i itself takes through the forwarding mechanism. Finally, it expands a macro (not pictured due to space reasons) checking that the store is in fact the youngest matching store in the store buffer. The model accomplishes this by ensuring that for all stores in between, either the virtual and physical tags do not match or the indexes of the middle stores are not present (because they have not yet executed).
Other possibilities exist for memory disambiguation. An advantage of µspec is that the axioms representing the approach we describe above can be easily replaced by those representing other solutions (e.g., load reexecution [15] ).
Memory Mapping/Remapping Functions, System
Calls, and Interrupts A second component of our Linux+SandyBridge model reflects the functionality of system calls and interrupts as they relate to memory mapping/remapping functions. This section describes mechanisms for how these work, particularly noting which parts are implemented in hardware and OS. The model also serves as an example of how key hardwareDefineMacro "EmbeddedIn" t1 t2: forall microops "i1", OnCore c i1 => OnThread t1 i1 => ( forall microops "i2", OnCore c i2 => OnThread t2 i2 => ( AddEdge ((i1, Commit), (i2, Fetch), "EmbeddedIn") \/ AddEdge ((i2, Commit), (i1, Fetch), "EmbeddedIn"))).
Axiom "IPIOrdering": forall threads "t1", forall threads "t2", (IsMainThread t1) =>~(IsMainThread t2) => (SameThread t1 t2) => ExpandMacro EmbeddedIn t1 t2 \/ ExpandMacro EmbeddedIn t2 t1. Figure 9 : Enumerating thread interleavings using µspec. The user specifies only the constraint that there exists some embedding; the solver later enumerates the possibilities.
OS functionality is reflected in our SandyBridge µspec model and the hardware and OS synopses. Mechanism: Although x86 TLB lookups and page table walks are performed by the hardware, x86 TLB coherence is OS-managed. To support this, x86 provides the privileged invlpg instruction, as well as the support for cores to communicate via inter-processor interrupts (IPIs). invlpg is a privileged instruction which serializes the instruction stream and invalidates the TLB entry containing the mapping corresponding to the specified virtual address. As a serializing instruction, invlpg causes all previous instructions to commit and drains all pending writes in the store buffer to memory before fetching the following instruction. invlpg also ensures that the next access to the virtual page invalidated will be a TLB miss, thus forcing the latest version of the corresponding page table entry to be brought into the TLB.
Linux Synopsis: Our Linux synopsis expands the system call mprotect into code snippets which 1) update the PTE appropriately, 2) invalidate the now-stale TLB entry on the current core, and 3) send TLB shootdowns to other cores via IPIs and interrupt handlers. The interrupt handler performs its own invlpg operation before sending an acknowledgment to the sender and returning from the interrupt.
SandyBridge Synopsis: The SandyBridge synopsis reflects ghost instructions added to reflect hardware-initiated memory references. In this case, the hardware synopsis first adds a ghost instruction representing the reception of the interrupt. This allows the µspec model to draw µhb edges reflecting that operation. Second, it adds a ghost instruction representing a write to the FLAGS register bit that determines whether interrupts are enabled, as on x86, after receiving an interrupt, subsequent interrupts are disabled until re-enabled by the handler or the OS. Interrupt re-enabling is handled by the OS code expanding to sequences containing either iret or cli instructions; both implicitly model writes to the FLAGS register as well.
µspec Axioms: Figure 9 shows how the orderings between these events are specified within our SandyBridge µspec model. This snippet shows a macro EmbeddedIn and an axiom IPIOrdering that makes use of it. The user sim-ply specifies the set of possibilities, and the solver (Section 5) automatically and efficiently enumerates all ways the axiom can be satisfied. A separate macro (not shown) adds pipeline-and store buffer-draining µhb edges representing the fact that interrupts are precise [19] .
Page Table Walks
Mechanism: On the x86 architecture, the page table walker is built into the hardware [20] . This means that page table walk loads are not issued by the user or by the OS; instead, they are contained entirely within hardware and are invisible to the user.
SandyBridge Synopsis: Every potential page table walk is instantiated by the microarchitecture synopsis as a set of ghost instruction loads of the page table entry. (The TLB is modeled as described in Section 6.6.)
µspec Axioms: Our model handles these ghost loads as follows. First, it does not draw Fetch, Dispatch, etc. nodes in the paths (i.e., columns) for these special loads, as they do not pass through the pipeline. Second, the axiom never uses predicates such as SameVirtualTag with them, since page table walks are done using only physical addresses. Third, since the loads are not TSO-ordered, they do not search the load buffer as in Section 6.2. Lastly, it adds exceptions to, e.g., the mfence axioms to omit µhb edges touching these instructions. The model does ensure, however, that page table walks are ordered with respect to invlpg [16] .
Status Bit Updates
Mechanism: When a page table accessed or dirty bit needs to be updated due to a memory access, our SandyBridge pipeline waits until the triggering instruction reaches the head of the reorder buffer. At that point, the processor injects microcode implementing the update into the buffer. It also must ensure that the update is ordered against younger instructions to prevent later loads from reading the now-stale state of the PTE from before the update.
SandyBridge Synopsis: For each store, the hardware synopsis instantiates dirty bit updates as ghost instructions performing a LOCKed RMW operation on the bits in memory. These instructions are inserted just before the triggering instruction. At a low level, we represent the read and the write of the RMW as separate microops, and atomicity is guaranteed by the µspec axioms described below.
µspec Axioms: The ghost instructions in a status bit update do traverse the Dispatch, Issue, and Commit stages, unlike the ghost page table walks, as the status bit updates do propagate through most of the pipeline and affect architectural state. They are not fetched, however. The orderings enforced for these ghost instructions are modeled in µspec by adding µhb edges to enforce that 1) all previous accesses must have committed, reflecting the condition that the triggering in- Core 1
Ld PTE(y) (i3.1) Ld PTE(x) Outcome: Forbidden; r1 = 2, r2 = 1 Figure 10 : Litmus test n5. Cycle shown with thicker edges. struction be at the head of the ROB, and 2) each update has LOCK semantics (i.e., mfence semantics plus atomicity).
Modeling TLB Occupancy
µspec Axioms: To model TLB occupancy in µhb graphs, we add two special new nodes to the paths of page table walk and status bit update ghost instructions. For page table walks and status bit updates, after the last memory access of the walk completes, the insertion of the entry into the TLB corresponds to a TLB entry creation event. Some time later, there is a TLB entry invalidation event that takes place for the same entry. Note that this invalidation, in general, occurs long after the page table walk has completed. This approach, which resembles the value-in-cache-line (ViCL) mechanism developed previously [29] , tracks the ordering of TLB state changes and applies equally well to microarchitectural variants such as allowing in-place updating of TLB status bits.
We then add a constraint stating that each instruction must read from a TLB entry which exists and which contains matching data (translation and status). More precisely, for a given instruction i accessing virtual address v and physical address p, this means that there must exist a ghost instruction g such that the data returned (for walks) or written (for updates) by g is a PTE mapping the tag of v to the tag of p. The relevant model axiom also checks for status and permission bits in the same way. Once the entry is found, Figure 11: Cyclic graph illustrating one possible ordering for litmus test ipi8 [38, 39] . Because the graph is cyclic (highlighted with thicker edges), this outcome is not observable in this case. In this case, the cycle was found before the PTEs for y were even enumerated. For this test, all executions lead to cyclic graphs, and hence the outcome is not observable, as expected.
the axiom adds two µhb edges representing that 1) the TLB entry must be created before the instruction can access it, and 2) the TLB entry must be accessed before it is invalidated. Note that each page table walk may be but need not be associated with a particular instruction. A TLB prefetch could trigger a page table walk at any point in an execution, and so there may be "floating" walks. The TLB occupancy model operates in exactly the same way in both cases.
Case Study Litmus Tests
In this section, we study three interesting test cases in the context of the system modeled in Section 6.
Dependence Checks and Store Buffer Forwarding
As described in Section 2, n5 synonym tests whether the store buffer forwarding mechanism takes physical addresses into account. If either core's store buffer does not realize that the two accesses from that core are synonyms, either load may be allowed to bypass the store before it, leading to an illegal outcome. Figure 10 shows one of the µhb graphs by which COATCheck verifies that such an (erroneous) outcome is impossible on our SandyBridge model 5 . The particular execution of Figure 10 shows the scenario in which the processor speculates that the store and load access different addresses and hence (under TSO rules) may be reordered. As in previous litmus tests, the red shading denotes hardware microcode operations (PT walks) executed on behalf of the user-level code. The columns of the µhb graph are annotated with instruction labels (user-level or microcode) corresponding to those in the litmus test.
When the load (i3.0) executes, it finds that the store buffer contains no previous entries with the same index (because in this scenario, the store (i2.0) has not yet issued). This leads to a happens-before edge (shown in thick blue in the figure) between the LB-SB-IndexCompare stage of (i3.0) and the SB-VTag/Index/Data stage of (i2.0). However, when the store (i2.0) does eventually execute, the condition under which it would not squash the speculatively-executed load is if the load buffer has no entries matching the same index. This could occur only if the load had not yet entered the load buffer. This situation would cause there to be a happens-before edge (also shown in thick blue) from the LBSearch stage of the (i2.0) store back to the LB-Index stage of the load (i3.0), thereby completing a happens-before cycle indicating that the scenario cannot occur in practice. Figure 11 shows the µhb graph for the Figure 12 scenario involving address remappings and TLB shootdowns. This scenario is derived from previous work [38, 39] ; however, we fill in some underspecified page mappings and initial conditions and adapt it to x86-TSO. The original test also considered two outcomes, one of which was observable and the other of which was forbidden. Here, we split this into two tests; we treat the permitted variant as a separate test and a sanity check that the legal outcome remains observable.
Page Remappings and TLB Shootdowns
At a high level, thread 0 changes the mapping for x (i0.0), triggers a TLB shootdown (i2.0), and sends a message to thread 1 (i4.0). Thread 1 receives the message (i7.0) and writes to x (i8.0), whose mapping was just modified. Cor- rectness dictates that this write use the new rather than the old mapping; however, this particular test has the load using the old, stale translation in an effort to have COATCheck verify that such a situation is unobservable. Thread 1 (i9.0) sends a message back to thread 0 (via i5.0), which checks (i6.0) that the value at x (according to the new mapping) was not overwritten by the thread 1 store (i8.0) (as it used the old mapping). These orderings (plus the remaining low-level details) cause COATCheck to find µhb cycles in all cases.
This graph combines many COATCheck features: IPIs and their handlers, microcode which does not pass through the entire pipeline, orderings enforced (or not) by fences on different types of orderings, and so on. The scale and complexity of these analyses emphasizes the need for tools like COATCheck to automate the enumeration of such graphs and identify the cycle (thicker highlighted lines) to demonstrate non-observable outcomes.
OS Responsibility for Synonym Tracking
A third case study discusses maintaining coherence among the status bits in a synonym set. Our SandyBridge hardware does not guarantee that dirty bit update ghost instructions will also update all synonym pages [20] ; the OS is responsible for identifying and updating dirty bits for any synonym PT entries. This can lead to a scenario in which data may be lost if this coordination is not implemented correctly.
Suppose x and y are synonyms mapped to PA a whose PTEs are both marked as clean. When a store is done to x, hardware will mark its PTE as dirty. Suppose the OS intends to swap out the physical page holding PA a and hence needs to check if the page is dirty. If it does so by only checking the PTE for y (and not checking the PTE for its synonym x), then a naive OS may incorrectly think the physical page is clean. We have implemented the model for this scenario (µhb graph not shown due to space reasons) and while the analysis accounts for all known happens-before orderings, an acyclic µhb graph can be found, indicating the event may be observable.
Fixing this case requires that at page eviction time, a lessnaive OS such as Linux checks whether PTEs for all members of a synonym set are marked clean. The ELT would therefore contain an extra load of PTE(x) and a proposed outcome indicating that this load returned a clean PTE. COATCheck would then detect a violation of the SandyBridge Reads axiom, which requires that each load return the value of the latest store to that physical address (since the dirty bit update would be ordered before the load), and conclude that the bad outcome is no longer observable.
This example highlights the fact that memory transistency models are broader in scope than memory consistency models, including SC-for-VAMC [38, 39] . Note that in the example, the bug may be observable even when there is no reordering of any kind taking place. In other words, the bug is observable even on a sequentially consistent system. Furthermore, since the two non-ghost instructions access different virtual and physical addresses, and the status bit updates target a different PTE than the non-ghost load uses, the necessary ordering requirement (i.e., to check the state of the synonym pages) is also outside the scope of VAMC. Hence, there may be a translation-related memory ordering bug even on a SC-for-VAMC system. COATCheck is the first MCM analysis framework which can capture and reason about this additional level of indirection, and it can do so regardless of which layer of Figure 2 is used to solve it.
Automated Verification Software
Test Characteristics
We have performance tested COATCheck on a wide-ranging set of 118 litmus tests. We include a number of tests from Intel and AMD manuals and other prior work to sanity check that our SandyBridge model (Section 6) behaves as expected [7, 17, 32, 45] .
Another category of litmus tests are modifications of the "standard" tests above to directly test address translation and OS interface issues. We either derived these from previous work [38, 39] or custom wrote them to test new functionality or scenarios. In some cases these originate as user-level codes and follow the full transformation path shown in Figure 3 . In a few cases, we wrote the tests directly as ELTs to expediently achieve the desired test scenario. In general, these litmus tests lead to larger graphs, because they employ more of the ghost instructions and system call modules that lead to test size growth en route to an ELT.
Lastly, we also include the case studies of Section 7, plus numerous variants thereof. In all, this gives us a wideranging suite of tests on which we perform our analysis. Figure 13 shows the full runtimes for our COATCheck implementation. Performance measurements were taken on a server with a 3.2GHz Intel Xeon E5-2667 v3 CPU. The runtimes shown in this graph are for the path from ELT rfinitial  ipi2  iwp28b  apic  ptwalk2  rf  mp  safe036  safe033  amd5  ptwalk3  dirtybit  safe022  rfi007  rfi001  rfi008  mp+staleld  mp  safe010  safe029  lb  safe028  mp+fences  rfi004  safe005  rwc-fenced  rfi002  intelbug  safe002  safe018  safe026  safe035  rfi014  safe006  sb  safe023  safe025  rfi006  rfi016  rfi018  sb  safe027  wrc  safe031  safe024  podwr000  safe021  safe004  safe032  safe034  iriw  safe037  safe017  testandset  safe030  testandset2  safe003  safe020  safe013  rfi000  n5  safe014  safe009  n4  safe007  safe012  dirtybit5  iwp28a  safe015  ipiordering  rwc-unf  safe000  ipi4  safe001  n5synonym  safe008  podwr001  sbsynpermit  safe019  safe011  amd10  n8  safe016  testandset2  ssl  iwp23b  n5  rfi012  n3  n6  rfi017  n7  rfi009  rfi003  rfi015  ptwalk  iwp27  iwp24  ipi1  rfi011  rfi005  rfi013  rfi010  amd3  co-mp  dirtybit2  n1  ipi3  n2  ipi5  ipi8  ipi6  co-iriw  ipiack  ipi7  dirtybit4  ipiack2 Runtime (s) Figure 13 : Execution times for full litmus test suite, sorted from smallest to largest run time.
Performance Results
through the constraint solver of Section 5. Recall that a cyclic µhb graph means that the event cannot be observed, and an acyclic µhb graph means that it is possible to observe. Therefore, when performing cycle checks, the cycle-checker can stop its analysis for a given graph as soon as a single cycle has been found in it. Likewise, when performing cycle checks for a litmus test intended to be forbidden, one can stop the checking for the whole litmus test as soon as a single acyclic graph has been found; one acyclic graph indicates an outcome intended to be forbidden might be observable. Figure 13 shows the runtimes of the tests, sorted in increasing order. All 118 tests complete in less than 100 seconds, and many are even faster. All tests taking more than 30 seconds were created for this paper to test address translation, IPIs, TLB behavior, and so on. Although these µhb graphs are the largest for which such enumerate-and-check approaches have been used-they often an order of magnitude larger than those from the original PipeCheck workour runtimes are similar to or less than those of PipeCheck. This shows that even though µspec is more general than previous work on µhb graphs [26, 27] , the COATCheck constraint solver algorithm and its implementation are orders of magnitude more efficient. This allows COATCheck to be suitable even for interactive verification, thereby dramatically improving ease of use and debugging in practice.
Related Work
Computer architects and verification experts have long studied MCMs and in recent years researchers have made significant progress in formalizing MCM specifications and analysis [3, 13, 23, 28, 30, 32, 40] . These efforts have clearly demonstrated that 1) there is a need for rigor when analyzing memory models, 2) both informal and formal hardware and software models are highly prone to bugs [4, 36] , and 3) it can take years to develop models which are sound with respect to hardware, sound with respect to the intention of the designers, and usable by programmers [8] [9] [10] .
While these contributions have shed light on how to correctly design high-performance shared memory systems, they do not distinguish virtual and physical addresses and do not adequately cover hardware-OS interactions. As such, researchers have only recently focused on the relationship between MCMs and address translation [38, 39] . While our efforts are partly inspired by their observations, their virtual address memory models do not as comprehensively span system layers as ours do. For example, the more abstract VAMC [38, 39] does not reason about the interactions of OS activities like system calls and interrupts, microarchitectural activities like microcode injection, and low-level details like hardware page table walks. Instead, COATCheck formalizes a methodology to understand their interactions, and to verify that their relationship with MCMs actually meets specifications. In fact, these low-level details are essential, not just to design correct systems in the face of increasing system complexity (e.g., with heterogeneous systems and unified address spaces [34, 35] ), but also to ensure that various recent TLB proposals on optimizations like prefetching [12, 41] , coalescing [33] , range TLBs [22] , and TLB shootdowns [37, 46] operate correctly.
Conclusions
Memory consistency models have long been difficult to define, implement, and analyze. The need to properly handle hardware-OS interface issues such as address translation only adds new complexity. This paper provides methods and a full, efficient toolflow for automatically specifying and verifying memory ordering at the hardware-OS interface. Through many detailed case studies, our work also pushes beyond existing definitions of "consistency" to the more general notion of "transistency", because the ordering requirements in some of our tests cannot be expressed by consistency models alone. The COATCheck toolset facilitates further exploration of hardware-OS memory ordering issues, both in support of system verification itself, and also in the context of forward-looking definitions and explorations of consistency and transistency.
